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A PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE: CITIZENS
UNITED’S IMPLICATIONS FOR
REGULATION OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION
OF PRESCRIPTION PHARMACEUTICALS
Kristie LaSalle*
I. INTRODUCTION
Al Caronia, a pharmaceutical sales representative for Orphan
Pharmaceuticals, a subsidiary of Jazz Pharmaceuticals, walked into
a physician’s office in Great Neck, New York on November 2,
2005.1 He had received several phone calls from the physician
asking about Xyrem,2 Orphan’s medication for the treatment of
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2012; B.A. Biology, Swarthmore
College, 2006. I owe an immeasurable debt of gratitude to Professor Aliza
Kaplan, not only for teaching me to write, but for her tireless support and
encouragement, and countless hours spent assisting in the writing and editing
process. This Note could not have been possible without her love and support. I
would like to thank Professors William Araiza and Joel Gora; Paul V. Avelar,
James Beck, and Adam Michaels, Esqs.; and Robert Sobelman, J.D. Candidate,
Brooklyn Law School, 2012; for their support, guidance, and suggestions during
the writing process. I would also like to thank the entire editorial staff of the
Journal of Law and Policy for their editorial assistance. Finally, thank you to my
family, Richard, Cathy, Kimberlee, and Cadie for their support in all of my
endeavors.
1
Brief for Petitioner at 4, United States v. Caronia, No. 09 Cr. 5006 (2d
Cir. filed Apr. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Caronia Brief]; Appendix to Caronia Brief
at A-32 (transcript of conversation, indicating physicians’ office address).
2
Id. at 3. This physician was an internal medicine specialist who,
unbeknownst to Mr. Caronia, had never prescribed a single narcoleptic. Id. Prior
to receiving phone calls from the physician, Mr. Caronia had never met him;
however, after receiving repeated phone calls, Mr. Caronia decided to add the
physician to the list of doctors whom he visited, and met with him for the first
time on October 26, 2005. Id. At the October 26 meeting, the physician asked
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cataplexy,3 a muscle disorder associated with narcolepsy,4 so Mr.
Caronia brought Dr. Peter Gleason with him to discuss his
experience prescribing the medicine.5 Mr. Caronia sat silently
while Dr. Gleason spoke with the physician, answering questions
about Xyrem’s different uses, including the treatment of Excessive
Daytime Sleepiness (“EDS”), a new use then under review by the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).6 So promising was that
treatment, in fact, that the FDA approved Xyrem for treatment of
EDS on November 18, 2005,7 just sixteen days after Mr. Caronia
and Dr. Gleason visited the physician’s office. A year and a half
later, however, on July 25, 2007, a federal grand jury indicted Mr.
Caronia and Dr. Gleason for illegally promoting a prescription
pharmaceutical.8 The physician, it turned out, was a confidential
informant for the FDA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) had recorded his meetings with Mr. Caronia and Dr.
Gleason.9 Prior to trial, Dr. Gleason pleaded guilty to a reduced
charge, becoming the first physician convicted of misbranding a
drug.10 Mr. Caronia was found guilty of criminally misbranding a
Mr. Caronia about several unapproved, or off-label, uses of Xyrem, and asked to
meet Dr. Gleason, a prominent physician in the field with experience prescribing
Xyrem. Id. at 3–4.
3
XYREM PRODUCT LABEL at 6 (July 17, 2002), available at http://www.
accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2002/21196lbl.pdf. Xyrem is a sleepinducing depressant. Id.
4
Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Narcolepsy Fact Sheet,
NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (last updated May 14, 2010), http://www.ninds.nih.gov/
disorders/narcolepsy/detail_narcolepsy.htm. Cataplexy is a debilitating symptom
of narcolepsy, triggered by strong emotions like anger or fear. It manifests as a
loss in muscle control, with the most severe cases resulting in physical collapse
and the inability to move, speak, or open one’s eyes. Id.
5
United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389–90 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
6
Caronia Brief, supra note 1, at 4; Appendix to Caronia Brief, supra note
1, at A-41 (transcript of conversation, discussing the use of Xyrem for EDS).
7
Letter from Russell Katz, Dir., Div. of Neurology Prods., Ctr. for Drug
Eval., FDA, to Dr. Reardan, Orphan Med., Inc. (Nov. 18, 2005).
8
See Indictment, United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (No. 06 Cr. 229).
9
Appendix to Caronia Brief, supra note 1, at A-32.
10
Judge Strikes Down First Amendment Arguments In Pharmaceutical
Sales Representative Federal Trial, FDA ADVER. & PROMOTION MANUAL &
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prescription pharmaceutical for promoting Xyrem for EDS,11 even
though the information related to the efficacy of Xyrem in treating
EDS was accurate and non-misleading, as evidenced by the FDA’s
approval of such a use a mere two weeks later. Why?
The FDA forbids drug manufacturers from marketing their
products for any use not expressly approved by the FDA.12
Promotion of an unapproved use is deemed off-label promotion,13
and may result in criminal and civil sanctions.14 The regulatory

NEWSL. 9 (FDA, Washington, D.C. Nov. 2008).
11
Appendix to Caronia Brief, supra note 1, at A-85 to A-86 (verdict sheet).
12
See Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 331 (West 2010).
13
Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 28 n.1 (D.D.C. 1995)
(Off-label use “refers to the use of a drug or device in a manner not approved by
the FDA and not set forth in the product’s labeling materials.”).
14
21 U.S.C.A. § 333. Many United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAOs),
especially the District of Massachusetts, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
and the Northern District of California, aggressively prosecute misbranding
infractions. See, e.g., Press Release, USAO, N. Dist. Cal., W. Scott Harkonen,
Former Biotech CEO, Convicted of Wire Fraud (Sept. 29, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/can/press/2009/2009_09_29_ harkonen.convicted.
press.html (announcing conviction of pharmaceutical CEO for promoting
Actimmune for an off-label use); Press Release, USAO, Dist. Mass., Drug
Maker Forest Pleads Guilty; Will Pay More Than $313 Million to Resolve
Criminal Charges and False Claims Act Allegations (Sept. 15, 2010), available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/Press%20Office%20-%20Press%20Release
%20Files/Sept2010/SettlementPressRelease.html; Press Release, USAO, Dist.
Mass., Pharmacia & Upjohn Company Inc. Pleads Guilty to Fraudulent
Marketing of Bextra (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.justice.
gov/usao/ma/Press%20Office%20-%20Press%20Release%20Files/Sept2009/
PharmaciaPlea.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Health and Human Servs.,
Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its
History (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009
pres/09/20090902a.html (announcing $2.3 billion settlement in the District of
Massachusetts); Press Release, USAO, E. Dist. of Pa., Pharmaceutical Company
Eli Lilly to Pay Record $1.415 Billion for Off-Label Drug Marketing (Jan. 15,
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/Pr/2009/jan/lilly
release.pdf; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Pharmaceutical Giant AstraZeneca
to Pay $520 Million for Off-label Drug Marketing (Apr. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-civ-487.html (announcing a plea
deal in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
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scheme surrounding off-label promotion15 is murky at best, and
leaves manufacturers little absolute guidance.16 Policy is delineated
largely by the FDA’s own interpretation of its regulatory power,
disseminated piecemeal in guidance documents, and often driven
by the FDA’s response to private litigation or other emerging
issues.17
Until recently, a similar regulatory scheme existed in a
seemingly unrelated field of free speech jurisprudence: corporate
political speech.18 Few recent Supreme Court decisions have
garnered as much criticism as the 2010 decision in Citizens United
v. FEC,19 in which the Supreme Court held that the Federal
15

See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99; see generally infra Part II.B.
See generally, e.g., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES
FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR
SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF
APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES, (Jan. 2009)
[hereinafter GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES] available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/
op/goodreprint.html.
17
For example, in one challenge to the FDA’s prohibition of off-label
promotion, the FDA stipulated that no previous guidance document
“independently authorizes the FDA to prohibit or sanction speech,” rendering
moot an injunction against prohibiting certain forms of off-label promotion
imposed at the trial court level. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney (WLF III), 202
F.3d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The FDA then promptly issued a guidance
document, interpreting the Circuit Court’s ruling as a holding that the “FDA,
consistent with its longstanding interpretation of the laws it administers, may
proceed, in the context of case-by-case enforcement, to determine from a
manufacturer’s written materials and activities how it intends that its products be
used.” Notice; Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed.
Reg. 14,286 (Mar. 16, 2000) [hereinafter WLF III Decision Notice].
18
See generally Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
19
Id.; see, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, at 39 (reporting the Citizens United decision arose from
the Court’s political preference for the Republican Party and/or its general
favoritism of corporate interests); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good
Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365,
2368–69 (2010); Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4 Reject Corporate Spending Limit,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A1. Perhaps the most well-known criticism of the
holding came from President Obama. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President
in the State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (“[L]ast week, the Supreme
Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for
16
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Elections Commission’s (“FEC”) regulation of corporate political
expenditures was unconstitutional.20 Much of the criticism focused
on the case’s implications for campaign finance;21 however, the
Court’s language and reasoning22 may have dramatic implications
for other areas of speech. In particular, Citizens United may signal
a dramatic increase in the rights of those engaged in heavilyregulated—and, to this point, heavily suppressed—commercial
speech.23 One area of commercial speech jurisprudence that may
change after Citizens United is the off-label promotion of
pharmaceutical products.
The Citizens United holding portrays an inherent mistrust of
the use of convoluted regulatory schemes to abridge speech. The
Court held that a muddled regulatory scheme essentially functions
as a prior restraint: it leaves a potential speaker with the
constitutionally unpalatable choice between remaining silent or
asking the government whether its speech is lawful.24 Justice
Kennedy’s declaration that prohibition of corporate independent
expenditures constituted an “unprecedented governmental
intervention into the realm of speech,”25 however, is misplaced: a
similar intrusion on speech rights exists in pharmaceutical
marketing regulation.26 The FDA’s prohibition of off-label
promotion applies regardless of whether the marketing message the
manufacturer wishes to disseminate is truthful and nonspecial interests—including foreign companies—to spend without limit in our
elections . . . . I don’t think American elections should be bankrolled by
America’s most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities.”).
20
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
21
See generally Wilson, supra note 19. This Note takes no normative
position on the wisdom or failings of Citizens United as applied to political
speech.
22
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896 (finding that muddled regulatory
schemes function as a prior restraint on speech).
23
See infra Part III. See also, generally, Tamara R. Piety, Citizens United
and the Threat to the Regulatory State, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS
16 (2010).
24
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896.
25
Id.
26
See generally Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99
(West 2010); GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16.
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misleading.27 The FDA’s transgressions upon the manufacturers’
speech rights bear many of the marks condemned in Citizens
United: the regulation constitutes “an outright ban [on speech],
backed by criminal sanctions”;28 the FDA regulates speech by
“carving out a limited exemption through an amorphous regulatory
interpretation”;29 and in doing so, the FDA paternalistically
“select[s] what . . . speech is safe for public consumption by
applying an ambiguous test.”30 Thus, under Citizens United, the
FDA’s prohibition of off-label promotion constitutes an
unconstitutional abridgement of commercial speech.
Fortunately, the similarities between the infirmities of the
FEC’s regulation of independent corporate political expenditures at
issue in Citizens United and those of the FDA’s regulation of offlabel promotion suggest that the solutions posed in Citizens United
to enable continuing regulation while respecting corporations’
political speech rights31 will also cure the constitutional failings of
the FDA’s off-label regulation. When properly construed, the
government’s interest in promoting the public health and safety
may be adequately addressed by requiring the speaker—that is, the
pharmaceutical manufacturer—to disclose the off-label nature of
its promotions.32
At the outset, clarification is necessary as to the limited form of
off-label promotion for which this Note advocates greater First
Amendment protection. That limited category of speech is (1)
truthful, accurate, and not misleading;33 (2) directed only to other
27

See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 351–52. Contra Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n N.Y, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (finding that, for
commercial speech to warrant First Amendment protection, “it at least must . . .
not be misleading”); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510 (1996)
(“[I]n keeping with our prior holdings, we conclude that a state legislature does
not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for
paternalistic purposes. . . .”).
28
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897. See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 333
(describing criminal and civil sanctions that attend misbranding).
29
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 889.
30
See id. at 896.
31
See id. at 915.
32
See id.
33
Fraudulent or inherently misleading commercial speech receives no First
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prescribing healthcare professionals;34 and (3) relates to off-label
uses of FDA-approved drugs only. Such speech would benefit the
public at large, were it to be permitted.35 Physicians may prescribe
a medication for any use, including off-label uses.36 Indeed, the
FDA itself recognizes that off-label prescribing may be safe, and
sometimes the standard of care for a particular patient or disease.37
Providing the proper constitutional protection for truthful, nonmisleading off-label promotion would facilitate the dissemination
of medical information to physicians. As explained below, public
health will be enhanced by dissemination of such information,
resulting in better-informed prescribing decisions by physicians.38
This Note addresses the First Amendment concerns implicated
by the FDA’s policies prohibiting off-label promotion of
prescription medications, and presents a potential solution. Part II
of this Note surveys the current state of the constitutional,
statutory, and regulatory frameworks, as well as the litigation
landscape, surrounding off-label promotion. Part III demonstrates
that Citizens United’s rationale extends beyond political speech to
heavily-regulated commercial speech. Specifically, the Court’s
concern that the FEC’s complex and “amorphous regulatory
interpretation”39 constitutes a restriction so inscrutable that it
functions as a prior restraint finds a ready parallel in the FDA’s
regulation of off-label promotion.
Finally, in applying the Court’s commercial speech analysis
Amendment protection. See infra Part II.A; Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243,
306 (Cal. 2002) (noting that, although some false political speech receives First
Amendment protection, the protection does not extend to false commercial
speech); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has
never been protected for its own sake.”).
34
This Note does not discuss the constitutional implications of the FDA’s
regulation of Direct to Consumer (DTC) marketing.
35
See infra Part IV.B.
36
Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled Indications, 12 FDA DRUG BULL.
4 (FDA, Washington, D.C., Apr. 1982).
37
GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16, § III.
38
See infra Part IV.B.
39
Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010).
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and the principles informing Citizens United, this Note concludes
in Part IV that the FDA’s current policies regarding off-label
promotion are unconstitutional under the First Amendment. A
commercial speech analysis, the test for which was set forth in
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation v. Public Service
Commission of New York,40 reveals that the constitutional failing is
twofold. First, the FDA, and courts who have previously
considered the constitutionality of the FDA’s prohibition on
speech, have misconstrued the purported government interest:41
rather, when properly construed, the interest is not advanced by—
and in fact may be hindered by—the prohibition of off-label
promotion. Second, the current policy is more restrictive than
necessary to serve that interest. Using United States v. Caronia42 as
an example, this Note advocates the adoption of a disclosure
regime, as approved of in Citizens United, which would better
serve public health while being less restrictive of speech.
II. COMMERCIAL SPEECH CHILLED: THE STATUTORY, REGULATORY,
AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION
Regardless of whether it is classified as pure, scientific, speech
or commercial speech,43 off-label promotion of prescription
pharmaceutical products is entitled to some First Amendment
40

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980); see infra Part II.A.
41
See United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(announcing as a substantial government interest “the government’s interest in
subjecting off-label uses to the FDA’s evaluation process as well as the
government’s interest in preserving the integrity of the [Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act’s] new drug approval process”); see also, generally, infra Part
IV.A.
42
United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
43
Although beyond the scope of this Note, there is good reason to question
whether off-label promotion is truly commercial speech or whether it is in fact
scientific, and therefore pure, speech entitled to the highest constitutional
protection. See generally, e.g., Glenn C. Smith, Avoiding Awkward Alchemy—In
the Off Label Drug Context and Beyond: Fully-Protected Independent Research
Should Not Transmogrify into Mere Commercial Speech Just Because Product
Manufacturers Distribute It, 34 WAKE FORREST L. REV. 963 (1999).
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protection.44 Yet under the current regulatory regime created by the
FDA, off-label promotion is all but prohibited.45 Challenges to the
constitutionality of this absolute prohibition have thus far done
little to vindicate manufacturers’ First Amendment rights.46
A. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
Despite the constitutional mandate that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,”47 commercial speech,
or speech which “does no more than propose a commercial
transaction,” has historically received diminished protection under
the First Amendment.48 Until the 1970s, commercial speech was
entitled to no constitutional protection whatsoever.49 In 1976, the
Supreme Court afforded limited constitutional protection to
commercial speech.50 In Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, the Court struck down a state ban on

44

See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 761 (1976); see generally Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (extending,
for the first time, qualified First Amendment protection to commercial speech);
see generally infra Part II.A.
45
See generally Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99
(West 2010); GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16; see generally infra
Parts II.B, II.B.2.
46
See generally Alliance for Natural Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp.
2d 48 (D.D.C. 2010); Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 385; Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d
at 912; Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C.
1998), vacated sub nom. WLF III, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Complaint,
Allergan, Inc. v. United States, No. 09 Civ. 1879 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 1, 2009);
see generally infra Parts II.C.1–II.C.4.
47
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
48
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
49
See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (finding “the
Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising”).
50
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773 (“What is at issue is whether
a State may completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful
[commercial] information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that
information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. . . . [W]e conclude
that the answer to this [question] is in the negative.”).
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advertising of drug prices by pharmacies.51 Eschewing the
paternalistic argument that the petitioner had an interest in
protecting “unwitting customers” from opting for “low-cost, lowquality service,”52 the Court noted that the consumer, seller, and
society at large had an interest in the “free flow of commercial
information” that “may be as keen, if not keener by far, than [the]
interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”53
On the heels of Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme
Court developed a test for determining whether commercial speech
received First Amendment protection.54 In Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York,
the Court struck down a ban on advertisements by electric utility
services,55 in part because respondent’s reasons for the ban
reflected its fear that the advertisements would needlessly increase
energy consumption and costs.56 Echoing its sentiments in Virginia
Board of Pharmacy, the Court rejected the government’s
inherently paternalistic suppression of commercial speech.57 The
Court set forth a four-prong test for assessing the constitutionality
of governmental restrictions on commercial speech:58 the speech
(1) “must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.”59
However, the government may ban truthful, non-misleading
speech if: (2) the asserted governmental interest in suppressing the

51

Id. at 762.
Id. at 769.
53
Id. at 763.
54
See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
55
Id. at 561.
56
Id. at 560–61.
57
See, e.g., id. at 562; see also id. at 574–75 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(noting that the restriction at issue was “a covert attempt [by the state] to
manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct regulation, but
by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free choice. . . . If
the First Amendment guarantee means anything, it means that, absent clear and
present danger, government has no power to restrict expression because of the
effect its message is likely to have on the public”).
58
See id. at 566.
59
Id.
52
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speech is substantial;60 (3) the regulation directly advances the
substantial governmental interest; and (4) the restriction on speech
is not “more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”61
The Central Hudson test was refined and fortified in 44
Liquormart v. Rhode Island, in which an unanimous Court struck
down a Rhode Island prohibition on advertising liquor prices
because the regulation failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the
Central Hudson test.62 Although the Court was divided in its
reasoning, Justice Thomas, concurring, expressed clear
disapprobation for the regulation’s attempts to control consumer
choice through the suppression of truthful, non-misleading
commercial speech; he argued that if paternalism provides the sole
support for a challenged regulation, application of the Central
Hudson test should be unnecessary, as the law is “per se
illegitimate.”63 It is clear that “the Supreme Court looks askance at
restrictions on commercial speech imposed for paternalistic
purposes.”64
B. Statutory and Regulatory Framework of Off-Label
Promotion
The FDA exercises authority over the production, sale, and
marketing of pharmaceutical products, pursuant to the Federal

60

Id.
Id.
62
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 486 (1996) (striking down
the regulations because Rhode Island “failed to establish the requisite
‘reasonable fit’ between its regulation and its goal”).
63
Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In cases such as this, in which the
government’s asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service
ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the balancing
test adopted in [Central Hudson] should not be applied, in my view. Rather,
such an ‘interest’ is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of
‘commercial’ speech than it can justify regulation of ‘noncommercial’ speech.”).
64
John Kamp, Daniel E. Troy & Elizabeth Alexander, FDA Marketing v.
First Amendment: Washington Legal Foundation Legal Challenges to Off-Label
Policies May Force Unprecedented Changes at FDA, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
555, 557 (1999).
61
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Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).65 The FDCA mandates
that all new drugs must be approved by the FDA as safe and
effective, based on extensive clinical and pre-clinical testing for
each intended use before introduction to the market.66
The FDCA does not, however, directly constrain physicians’
decisions to prescribe drugs off-label.67 Congress has not endowed
the FDA with the authority to prohibit physicians from prescribing
medications off-label.68 Rather, the FDA has recognized that
Congress did not intend FDA to interfere with the practice
of medicine. Thus, once a product is approved for
marketing for a specific use, FDA generally does not
regulate how, or for what uses, physicians prescribe [it]. A
licensed physician may prescribe a drug for other uses, or
in treatments, regimens, or patient populations, that are not
listed on the FDA-approved labeling.69
Nevertheless, by manipulating the information disseminated to
physicians, the FDA exerts substantial control over their
prescribing habits.70
65

Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99 (2010).
See id. §§ 321, 355, 360m.
67
See id. § 396 (reflecting Congress’s amendment of the FDCA to clarify
that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or interfere with the
authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally
marketed [drug] to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate
health care practitioner-patient relationship”).
68
See id. This particular provision of FDAMA was enacted in response to
the FDA’s assertion that “The [FDCA] provides [the] FDA with explicit
regulatory authority over the use of [drugs].” James M. Beck & Elizabeth D.
Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and
Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 78 (1998) (quoting Attachment to
Letter from FDA to Hon. Joseph Barton, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigation, House Comm. on Commerce (Apr. 14, 1995)).
69
Beck & Azari, supra note 68, at 78 n.64 (quoting Michael Friedman,
Deputy Comm’r for Operations, FDA, Prepared Statement Before the
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (Sept. 12, 1996)).
70
See David M. Fritch, Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil, Harm the Patient?:
Why the FDA Needs to Seek More, Rather Than Less, Speech From Drug
Manufacturers On Off-Label Drug Treatments, 9 MICH. ST. U. J. MED & L. 315,
336 (2005) (“While the FDA lacks direct authority to directly impose limitations
66
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Within the drug approval process, the FDA retains authority
over the labeling of the drug.71 A drug’s label must detail its risks,
benefits, and adequate instructions for use.72 The FDA only
approves a drug for sale if its labeling conforms to the FDA’s
specifications.73 “Labeling” is a term of art, which, in addition to
physical labels affixed to the drug’s packaging, encompasses all
written, printed, or graphic material “accompanying” the drug.74
“Accompanying” includes not only materials physically associated
with the distribution of the drug itself, but all materials
supplementing or explaining the product.75 According to the
FDA’s own interpretation of the scope of its power, the term
“labeling” encompasses nearly every form of manufacturer
communication.76 The FDA has also adopted an expansive
definition of promotion to include nearly every interpersonal
contact between representatives of pharmaceutical manufacturers
and prescribers or the public at large.77
It is unlawful for the manufacturer to introduce a “misbranded”
or “adulterated” drug into interstate commerce.78 A drug is
on physicians’ prescribing habits, its ability to limit the dissemination of
information regarding off-label uses to prescribing physicians represents a
significant indirect control over how physicians prescribe medications.”).
71
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(f).
72
See, e.g., id.
73
Id. §§ 331(a), (d).
74
Id. §§ 321(k–m).
75
Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1948).
76
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(1–2) (2010) (defining “labeling” as “[b]rochures,
booklets, mailing pieces, detailing pieces, file cards, bulletins, calendars, price
lists, catalogs, house organs, letters, motion picture films, film strips, lantern
slides, sound recordings, exhibits, literature, and reprints, and similar pieces of
printed, audio, or visual matter descriptive of a drug and references published
(for example, the Physicians’ Desk Reference)” and promotional materials).
77
See Joseph Leghorn, Elizabeth Brophy & Peter V. Rother, The First
Amendment and FDA Restrictions on Off-Label Uses: The Call for a New
Approach, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 394 (2008) (identifying “certain companysupported scientific or educational activities,” “initiation of person-to-person
contact between sales representatives and prescribers,” “direct-to-consumer
advertisements,” and “improper dissemination of information about an
investigational drug during a clinical trial” as promotional activities).
78
21 U.S.C.A. § 331.
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misbranded or adulterated if its labeling is “false or misleading in
any particular”79 or if it includes information regarding a use not
approved by the FDA.80 Promotion of a drug in a manner
inconsistent with its labeling results in the drug being
“misbranded.”81 Because the FDA approves drugs for specific
uses, promotional activity that covers uses which are not included
in the label, or “off-label” promotion, is a form of misbranding82
and is prohibited.83 The FDA is empowered to enjoin
manufacturers who promote drugs for off-label uses,84 to seize
those drugs,85 and in some cases, to seek criminal sanctions.86
The prohibition is absolute, banning not only fraudulent and
untruthful marketing activity, but truthful, non-misleading
information as well.87 The FDA’s sweeping prohibition of off-label
promotion has drawn significant criticism on constitutional
grounds.88 First, it constitutes a restriction on who may speak,89
79

Id. § 352(a).
Id. § 351.
81
Id.
82
Id. §§ 351–52 (2006). Off-label uses include use for a condition not
included in the label, use in a patient population for which the drug has not been
approved as safe and effective (such as pediatrics), or use in dosages different
from those in the label (such as a higher than approved dose, or dosing twice,
rather than once, daily). Id.
83
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (2010); Citizen Petition Regarding the Food
and Drug Administration’s Policy on Promotion of Unapproved Uses of
Approved Drugs and Devices; Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 59820,
59821 (Nov. 18, 1994).
84
21 U.S.C.A. § 332(a).
85
Id. § 334(a).
86
Id. § 333.
87
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (mandating that “[a]n advertisement for a
prescription drug . . . shall not recommend or suggest any use that is not in the
labeling,” regardless of the veracity of the claims made).
88
See generally WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998); John E. Osborn,
Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective on Regulating Off-Label
Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH & POL’Y L. & ETHICS
299 (2010); Frederick R. Ball, Erin M. Duffy & Nina L. Russakoff, The First
Amendment and Off-Label Promotion: Why the Court in United States v.
Caronia Got it Wrong, 2009 BENDER’S HEALTHCARE L. MONTHLY 1 (2009);
Fritch, supra note 70, at 315; A. Elizabeth Blackwell & James M. Beck, Drug
80
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because physicians may freely discuss amongst themselves offlabel uses, and may prescribe a medication for any purpose,90 yet a
manufacturer may not.91 Second, the restriction on commercial
speech is more expansive than necessary to ensure public health
and safety.92
C. Legal Challenges to the FDA’s Prohibition of Off-Label
Promotion
In the past two decades, several legal challenges to the FDA’s
regulatory scheme have been brought in federal court.93 These
lawsuits, while challenging various provisions within the FDA’s
regulatory framework, all attack the prohibition of off-label
promotion as an impermissible abridgement of commercial speech
in violation of the First Amendment.94 Constitutional challenges to
this commercial speech restriction have met with mixed results,
Manufacturers’ First Amendment Right to Advertise and Promote Their
Products for Off-Label Use: Avoiding a Pyrrhic Victory, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
439 (2003).
89
See infra Part III.B.1.
90
Viagra, for example, is best known for its use in treating erectile
dysfunction (ED), but, it was originally approved for use in treating angina—
chest pain associated with cardiac disease. Its discovery and success as an ED
drug hails from what was originally an off-label use. See Fritch, supra note 70,
at 319 n.9 (citations omitted). Efficacy has also been demonstrated for other offlabel uses, including treating premature babies with under-developed lungs. See
id. Another example can be found in verapamil, a calcium-channel blocker
FDA-approved for treatment of heart disease. Physicians find them to be
efficacious for treating headaches, including migraines, yet the FDA has not
approved them for treatment of headaches. See Daniel B. Klein & Alexander
Tabarrok, Do Off-Label Drug Practices Argue Against FDA Efficacy
Requirements?, 67 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIOL. 743, 756 (2008).
91
See generally 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 351–52; 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a).
92
See infra Part III.D.2.
93
See generally infra Parts II.C.1–II.C.4; Alliance for Natural Health, U.S.
v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2010); United States v. Caronia, 576 F.
Supp. 2d 385, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d
912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2003); WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51; Complaint, Allergan, supra
note 46.
94
See supra note 93.
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leaving the status of the FDA’s prohibition of off-label promotion
very much unsettled.
1. Washington Legal Foundation
The first challenge to the FDA’s policies came in 1997, and
concerned two guidance documents restricting (1) dissemination of
peer-reviewed scientific journal articles and textbooks by
manufacturers and (2) manufacturer-sponsored continuing medical
education programs (“CMEs”).95 The Washington Legal
Foundation (“WLF”)96 sought to enjoin the FDA from enforcing
these policies on free speech grounds.97 After determining that offlabel promotion constituted commercial speech, the district court
applied the Central Hudson test.98 The court found that the speech
at issue was truthful and not inherently misleading.99 Although the
court recognized that the government had a substantial interest in
protecting public health and safety by incentivizing manufacturers
to seek FDA approval for off-label uses,100 which was directly
advanced by the challenged regulations,101 it nevertheless declared
the FDA’s policies unconstitutional because it found the restriction
on speech to be more extensive than necessary.102 The court found
that there were less restrictive alternatives available, including a
95

See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational
Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Final Guidance
Regulation]; Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800
(1996).
96
The Washington Legal Foundation is “a nonprofit public interest law and
policy center that defends ‘the rights of individuals and businesses to go about
their affairs without undue influence from government regulators.’” WLF I, 13
F. Supp. 2d at 54 (internal citations omitted); Wash. Legal Found., WLF
Mission, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., http://www.wlf.org/org/mission.asp (last
visited Apr. 8, 2011).
97
WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 54.
98
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 567 (1980); see supra Part II.A.
99
WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 65–69.
100
Id. at 69–71.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 72–74.
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“full, complete, and unambiguous disclosure by the manufacturer”
that the advocated use is off-label and not FDA approved.103 Faced
with such disclosure, “[a] physician would be immediately alerted
to the fact that the ‘substantial evidence standard’ had not been
satisfied, and would evaluate the communicated message
accordingly.”104
After the decision in WLF I, the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 (“FDAMA”) took effect.105 Within
FDAMA, the very policies declared unconstitutional in WLF I
were codified in section 401.106 In a separate decision, WLF II,107
the district court sua sponte extended its WLF I ruling to apply to
section 401 of FDAMA, declared that section unconstitutional, and
enjoined the FDA from enforcing it.108
On appeal, the FDA disclaimed its original argument that
FDAMA authorized the FDA to regulate or prohibit speech,109
stating instead that “in its view, neither the FDAMA nor the CME
guidance independently authorizes the FDA to prohibit or sanction
speech.”110 At oral argument the FDA elected to interpret section
401 as providing a “safe harbor,” that ensures that certain types of
conduct would not be used against manufacturers in criminal
actions for misbranding.111 It insisted, however, that FDAMA
permitted criminal sanctions against any manufacturer who
completely disregarded section 401’s conditions on off-label
promotion “provides that a manufacturer who disregards [section

103

Id. at 73; see also id. 68–69.
Id. at 73.
105
Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act, Pub L. No. 105-115
(1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 360aaa (West 2010)).
106
See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney (WLF II), 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87
(1999).
107
See generally id. The opinion in WLF II was necessitated after the
government sought declaratory relief from the WLF I court that the court’s
ruling did not apply to section 401 of FDAMA. Id. at 83–84.
108
Id. at 88–89.
109
See WLF III, 202 F.3d 331, 335 (2000).
110
Id.
111
Id. at 335.
104
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401]’s conditions . . . might be liable in some fashion.”112 The
FDA’s new interpretation brought its position in line with WLF’s,
eliminating the controversy.113 The D.C. Circuit lamented the lost
opportunity to resolve “a difficult constitutional question of
considerable practical importance” and noted that, because of the
FDA’s concession, “the dispute between the parties has
disappeared before our eyes.”114 It vacated the WLF I and WLF II
rulings for want of controversy.115 In the wake of WLF III, the
FDA interpreted the Circuit’s ruling to mean that the “FDA,
consistent with its longstanding interpretation of the laws it
administers, may proceed, on a case-by-case basis, to determine
from a manufacturer’s written materials and activities how it
intends that its products be used.”116 Although the WLF decisions
addressed only a narrow subset of off-label speech—distribution of
scientific literature and sponsorship of CMEs117—the district
court’s vacated opinions influenced subsequent decisions
addressing the constitutionality of restrictions on off-label
promotion.118
2. United States v. Caputo
In 2003, the FDA’s prohibition of off-label promotion faced
another constitutional challenge.119 In United States v. Caputo, the
defendants challenged the FDA’s prohibition of off-label
promotion of a medical device.120 The district court largely
112

Id.
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 336.
116
WLF III Decision Notice, supra note 17.
117
See Final Guidance Regulation, supra note 95; Advertising and
Promotion, supra note 95.
118
See, e.g., United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921–22 (N.D.
Ill. 2003) (adopting the reasoning of the WLF district court).
119
See generally id.
120
Id. at 912. This case is notable for Caputo’s particularly egregious
marketing behavior and disregard for FDA regulations, see id. at 915–16;
however the holding and analysis ultimately affect all manufacturers, regardless
113
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adopted WLF I’s reasoning, but departed from WLF I in holding
that the prohibition was constitutional.121 In addressing the FDA’s
interest in restricting speech, the court reasoned that “[p]ermitting
manufacturers to promote off-label uses would completely
undermine the government’s interest in subjecting off-label uses to
the FDA’s evaluation process as well as the government’s interest
in preserving the FDCA’s new drug approval process.”122
Distinguishing the promotion at issue in Caputo from the
dissemination of academic writing and sponsorship of CMEs in
WLF I, Caputo found prohibition of all off-label promotion—even
that which is truthful and non-misleading—to be constitutional
because “permitting Defendants to engage in all forms of truthful,
non-misleading promotion of off-label use would severely frustrate
the FDA’s ability to evaluate the effectiveness of off-label uses.”123
Because the court could not envision a less restrictive means of
achieving this interest, it preserved the FDA’s authority to prohibit
off-label commercial speech.124 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit did
not resolve the First Amendment quandary, and declared that it
“[f]ortunately . . . need not decide today whether a seller of drugs .
. . has a constitutional right to promote off label uses,”125 affirming
Caputo on more narrow grounds.126
3. Allergan
More recently, the FDA commenced a barrage of civil and
criminal sanctions against the manufacturer Allergan, Inc. for
alleged off-label marketing of its pharmaceutical product,
Botox.127 Allergan fought back, filing a civil suit challenging the
of their culpability.
121
Id. at 921–22.
122
Id. at 921.
123
Id. at 922.
124
Id.
125
United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2008).
126
See id. at 941 (declining to proceed with a Central Hudson analysis
because, given the particularly egregious marketing endeavors of Mr. Caputo,
“[t]here was no lawful activity . . . to promote”).
127
See Information, United States v. Allergan, Inc., No. 10 Cr. 375 (N.D.
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constitutionality of the prohibition on First Amendment grounds.128
With the threat of massive civil and criminal penalties looming,
Allergan was permitted to plead guilty and settle the civil
complaints, conditioned upon abandonment of its First
Amendment suit.129 The settlement left the question of the
constitutionality of the FDA’s prohibitions unanswered.
4. Caronia’s First Amendment Challenge
The FDA investigated alleged off-label promotion of Xyrem by
Jazz Pharmaceuticals, resulting in the indictment of Caronia on
two misdemeanor counts:130 (1) conspiracy to misbrand Xyrem by
marketing it to the undercover informant-physician for off-label
uses;131 and (2) misbranding a drug held for sale in interstate
commerce.132 Caronia moved to dismiss the charges because, inter

Ga. Sept. 1, 2010); Complaint, United States ex rel. Hallivis v. Allergan, Inc.,
No. 09 Civ. 3434 (D. Md. Oct. 26, 2009); Complaint, United States ex rel.
Beilfuss v. Allergan, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 1883 (D. Mass. May 27, 2008);
Complaint, United States ex rel. Lang v. Allergan, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 1288 (N.D.
Ga. June 5, 2007).
128
Complaint, Allergan, supra note 46.
129
See Press Release, Allergan, Inc., Allergan Resolves United States
Government Investigation of Past Sales and Marketing Practices Relating to
Certain Therapeutic Uses of Botox® (Sept. 1, 2010), available at
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/cc/Allergan_settlement090110.pdf (“To resolve the
criminal and civil investigation, Allergan was required by the Government to
dismiss Allergan’s First Amendment lawsuit . . . in which Allergan sought a
ruling that it could proactively share truthful scientific and medical information
with the medical community to assist physicians in evaluating the risks and
benefits [of off-label uses of Botox].”(emphasis added)); see also Press Release,
Dep’t of Justice, Allergan Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $600 Million to
Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Botox® (Sept. 1, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-civ-988.html.
130
United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
131
Id.; see Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331(a) & (k) (West
2010); Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. §
371 (West 2010).
132
Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 389. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331(k) &
331(a)(1).
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alia, the misbranding provisions violated his free speech rights.133
The court found that the off-label promotion constituted
commercial speech,134 and that the provisions did not violate the
First Amendment.135
Under Central Hudson, the threshold question is not whether
the speech itself is unlawful: such a test would present a closed
tautology;136 the question is whether the conduct urged by the
speech is unlawful.137 Relying on WLF I, Caronia held that,
because physicians may prescribe Xyrem for off-label uses,
Caronia’s speech did not concern unlawful activity,138 and that the
statements were not inherently misleading.139 Adopting the
reasoning of WLF I and Caputo, Caronia found that physicians
receiving Caronia’s speech were generally aware of the FDAapproval process and its implications, and could adequately
evaluate the validity of their claims: the Caronia court wrote
“[g]iven the sophistication of the audience to whom the off-label
uses were promoted, this Court cannot conclude . . . that

133

Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 393.
Id. at 396. The court noted that:
regardless what else might have been covered in his discussions,
Caronia’s alleged speech was made on behalf of the manufacturer and
clearly (1) encouraged physicians to prescribe Xyrem, (2) referred to a
specific product, and (3) was economically motivated. Any such
promotion by Caronia to physicians on behalf of Xyrem’s manufacturer
of the drug’s off-label uses would be commercial speech and be
“entitled to the qualified but nonetheless substantial protection
accorded to commercial speech.”
Id. (citing Bolger v. Young Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983)).
135
Id. at 402.
136
See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF
III, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting the FDA’s argument that off-label
speech concerns unlawful activity because off-label promotion violates federal
law).
137
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 n.7 (1996) (“[T]he
First Amendment does not protect speech about unlawful activities.” (emphasis
added)).
138
Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 397–98.
139
Id.
134

LASALLE - FINAL.DOC

888

5/9/2011 4:16 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

[Caronia’s] speech was inherently misleading.”140
Turning to the second prong of the Central Hudson test,
Caronia found, relying on WLF I, that restricting off-label
promotion served a substantial government interest.141 Caronia
acknowledged the substantial government interest in protecting the
health and the public142 and that, in order to attain that objective,
the government had “a substantial interest in compelling
manufacturers to get off-label treatments on-label.”143 In
addressing the third prong of the Central Hudson test, and relying
yet again on WLF I and Caputo, the Caronia court ruled that
prohibition of off-label promotion directly advanced the
“substantial government interest in requiring manufacturers to
submit supplemental applications to obtain FDA approval for new
uses of previously approved drugs.”144
Finally, addressing the fourth prong of the Central Hudson
test—whether the prohibition is only as extensive as is necessary to
further the government’s interest145—the court distinguished WLF
I, which concerned only a limited form of off-label speech.146 The
Caronia court failed to recognize the WLF I finding that a less
restrictive alternative to absolute prohibition existed: namely, “full,
complete, and unambiguous disclosure by the manufacturer of its
involvement in the subject activities and the fact that the uses
discussed were off-label,”147 and relied instead on WLF I dicta that
140

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (citing United States
v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
141
Id. at 398.
142
Id.
143
Id.; accord Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 921; WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51,
72 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF III, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(“[O]ne of the few mechanisms available to the FDA to compel manufacturer
behavior [with regard to ensuring the safety of new uses for drugs] is to
constrain marketing options; i.e. control labeling, advertising, and marketing.”).
144
Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 398.
145
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 569–70 (1980).
146
See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 54; see also Final Guidance Regulation,
supra note 95; Advertising and Promotion, supra note 95.
147
Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 399 (citing WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 57–
58).
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“[w]ere manufacturers permitted to engage in all forms of
marketing of off-label treatments, a different result might be
compelled.”148 Instead, it relied on Caputo’s finding that a First
Amendment challenge to the off-label prohibition threatened the
FDA’s ability to control and prohibit manufacturer’s off-label
promotion.149 Noting that no less restrictive means of advancing
the government’s interest was identified in Caputo,150 Caronia
concluded that “the prohibitions . . . pass constitutional muster
under the fourth prong of Central Hudson.”151
III. CITIZENS UNITED: FROM POLITICAL SPEECH TO COMMERCIAL
SPEECH
The Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United v. F.E.C. has
garnered significant criticism for its implications for corporate
participation in political discourse.152 However, the Court’s
reasoning in striking down the FEC’s regulatory scheme153 may
impact other areas of heavily regulated speech, including some
forms of commercial speech, such as the off-label promotion of
prescription pharmaceuticals.

148
149
150

Id. (second emphasis added).
United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 399 (citing Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at

922).
151

Id. at 401–02 (“[T]his Court is unable to identify non-speech restrictions
that would likely constrain in any effective way manufacturers from
circumventing [the FDA’s] approval process.” (citing Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d
at 922)).
152
See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 19, at 39 (reporting the Citizens United
decision arose from the Court’s political preference for the Republican Party
and/or its general favoritism of corporate interests); Walker Wilson, supra note
19, at 2368–69; Liptak, supra note 19, at A1; Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President in the State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (“[L]ast week, the
Supreme Court reversed a century of law to open the floodgates for special
interests—including foreign companies—to spend without limit in our elections
. . . . Well, I don’t think American elections should be bankrolled by America’s
most powerful interests, and worse, by foreign entities.”).
153
Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 896 (2010).
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A. The Citizens United Decision

In January 2008, Citizens United, a non-profit organization,
aired Hillary: the Movie154 that criticized then-Senator Hillary
Clinton,155 and sought to dissuade voters from electing her as the
Democratic candidate for President.156 Citizens United wanted to
make the film available via online video-on-demand in the days
leading to the 2008 primary.157 It feared, however, it might violate
section 441b of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,158 which
prohibited corporations and unions from using general treasury
funds to finance advocacy for the election or defeat of a
candidate.159 Citizens United sought a declaratory judgment that it
could air Hillary, as well as injunctive relief against the FEC in a
District of Columbia trial court.160 That court granted summary
judgment in favor of the FEC, finding the law constitutional, both
facially and as applied to Citizens United.161 The Supreme Court
heard the appeal directly, and held section 441b’s prohibition of
corporate electioneering unconstitutional.162 Writing for the Court,
Justice Kennedy called the FEC’s ambiguous regulatory scheme an
“unprecedented governmental intervention into the realm of
speech.”163

154

Id. at 886–87.
Id. at 887 (“[T]o promote the film, [Citizens United] produced two 10second ads and one 30-second ad for Hillary. Each ad includes a short (and in
our view, pejorative) statement about Senator Clinton.”).
156
Id. at 888.
157
Id. at 887–88.
158
Id. at 887.
159
See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2) (West
2010).
160
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 913; see 2 U.S.C. § 441b.
163
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896.
155
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B. But Is It Unprecedented? Citizens United and Off-Label
Promotion
A regulatory scheme analogous to the regulation of corporate
political speech found unconstitutional in Citizens United exists in
the prohibition of off-label promotion.164 An examination of the
parallels between the FDA’s regulation of off-label promotion and
the FEC’s regulation of corporate political speech reveals that the
FDA’s regulation should fail under the principles set forth in
Citizens United.
1. The FDA’s Prohibition of Off-Label Promotion By
Manufacturers, Like the Prohibitions in Citizens United,
Constitutes a Restriction On Who May Speak
Citizens United recognized that the ban on corporate
independent expenditures constituted a restriction on who may
speak.165 In terms reaching more broadly than political speech
alone, the Court noted that:
[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power, the First
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain
subjects or viewpoints. Prohibited too are restrictions
distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech
by some but not others. As instruments to censor, these
categories are interrelated: speech restrictions based on the
identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to
control content.166
The Court continued, finding that if the regulation applied to
individuals, not corporations, engaged in political advocacy, “no
one would believe that it is merely a time, place, or manner
restriction on speech. Its purpose and effect are to silence entities
whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.”167
Likewise, the FDA’s prohibition of off-label promotion is a
164
165
166
167

See supra Part II.B.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898–99.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 898.
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restraint based upon government mistrust of a particular speaker.
Believing, rightly or wrongly, that a manufacturer may attempt to
persuade physicians to prescribe their drug, and believing, rightly
or wrongly, that such a speech is harmful,168 the FDA severely
limits the ways in which manufacturers may discuss with
physicians truthful, non-misleading, peer-reviewed scientific or
medical journal articles related to an off-label use.169 Yet that
discussion between two physicians, when each is unaffiliated with
a pharmaceutical company, is fully protected scientific speech
entitled to the highest First Amendment protection.170 When the
manufacturer or its agent speaks, however, the same speech
magically transforms into commercial speech171—the red-headed
stepchild of First Amendment jurisprudence172—and the
manufacturer may face criminal liability.173 The facts of Caronia
make the disparity clear: Dr. Gleason became the first physician
ever prosecuted under the misbranding statutes174 because he spoke
about an off-label use of a drug on behalf of its manufacturer.175
168

But see infra Parts VI.A & B.
See Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99 (West 2010);
GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16, § II.
170
See Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d
384, 458 (D.N.J. 2009) (citing WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 63 (D.D.C. 1998));
WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (noting that “[i]t is beyond dispute that when
considered outside of the context of manufacturer promotion of their drug
products, CME seminars, peer-reviewed medical journal articles and
commercially-available medical textbooks merit the highest degree of
constitutional protection” because “[s]cientific and academic speech reside at
the core of the First Amendment”).
171
See United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395–96 (E.D.N.Y.
2008); WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 62–65. See also, generally, United States v.
Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (failing to even consider whether
off-label promotion constitutes commercial speech before commencing a
Central Hudson analysis).
172
See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (noting
that commercial speech receives “a limited measure of protection,
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values” (emphasis added)).
173
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(k) (2010).
174
Judge Strikes Down First Amendment Arguments, supra note 10, at 9.
175
Id.
169
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Had he instead discussed the same topic, made the same
recommendations, and said the same exact words while at a casual
dinner with a colleague, no criminal sanctions would attach.176
That speech regarding off-label uses of a drug becomes criminal
only when a manufacturer speaks makes the constitutional
infirmity of the FDA’s regulation pellucid.
2. Under Citizens United, the FDA’s Ambiguous Regulatory
Scheme Functions Like a Prior Restraint on Speech
Citizens United identified section 441b as “an outright ban [on
speech], backed by criminal sanctions.”177 Acknowledging that the
ban does not constitute a prior restraint on speech in the traditional
sense,178 the Court noted that “[a]s a practical matter, however,
given the complexity of the regulations and the deference courts
show to administrative determinations, a speaker who wants to
avoid the threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of
defending against FEC must ask a governmental agency for prior
permission to speak.”179 That is, a corporation could not discern
whether its proposed speech was lawful from the perplexing
regulatory scheme cobbled together by the FEC, and was therefore
forced either to remain silent or to ask the government to pass upon
the acceptability of its speech prior to speaking.180 The FEC, in
essence, created a regulatory regime where it could “select what
political speech is safe for public consumption by applying
ambiguous tests”181 which the Court roundly criticized.182
176

In Caronia, the District court was even hesitant to apply the ban to Dr.
Gleason—noting his favored status as a physician. See Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d
at 395–96.
177
Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010).
178
Id. at 895 (noting that “prospective speakers are not compelled by law to
seek an advisory opinion from the FEC before the speech takes place” (emphasis
added)).
179
Id. at 896 (citing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 2 U.S.C.A. § 437(f)
(West 2010)) (equating the regulation to “licensing laws implemented in the
16th- and 17th century England, laws and governmental practices of the sort that
the First Amendment was drawn to prohibit”).
180
See id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 437(f)).
181
Id. at 896. The Supreme Court held that “[t]he Government may
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The complexity of the FDA’s ban of off-label promotion has
clear parallels to the regulatory scheme struck down in Citizens
United. The FDA’s regulatory scheme is hopelessly muddled, so as
to fail to provide clear guidance as to what promotional activities
are permitted. Despite the codification of the FDA’s authority in
the FDCA183 and FDAMA,184 the FDA continues to disseminate
guidance documents containing “amorphous regulatory
interpretation”;185 and in so doing it essentially “select[s] what . . .
speech is safe for public consumption by applying an ambiguous
test.”186 As in Citizens United, a regulatory agency—this time the
FDA—has constructed an abstruse regulatory scheme that
essentially functions as a prior restraint on speech.187
regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure
requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.” Id. at 886.
182
Id. at 895–96 (comparing the FEC’s regulatory scheme to the English
licensing laws of the 16th and 17th centuries that prompted the ratification of the
First Amendment, and describing the ill-effects of such a regulatory scheme on
modern free speech).
183
See Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99 (West 2010).
184
See FDAMA, Pub L. 105-115 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 360aaa
(West 2010)).
185
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 889.
186
Id. at 896.
187
See id. at 895–96. Although commercial speech receives some First
Amendment protection, see supra Part II.A, the Supreme Court has intimated
from the inception of the commercial speech doctrine that some protections
available to other speech might be unavailable to commercial speech. In
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun noted that because
“commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds [of speech] . . . there
is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.”
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
772 n.24 (1976) (emphasis added). As a result, “the greater objectivity and
hardiness of commercial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate
inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker,” id. (emphasis added),
and “may also make inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints.” Id.
(emphasis added). Relying on this equivocal, footnoted statement in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy, the Central Hudson Court found it would be
appropriate to require “a system of previewing advertising campaigns to insure
that they will not defeat” governmental objectives. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571 n.13 (1980). The
Supreme Court, however, has never definitively held that the doctrine of prior
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In the FDA’s most recent interpretation of its own authority to
regulate the dissemination of truthful, non-misleading, peerreviewed scientific journal articles, the infirmity of a de facto prior
restraint is pellucid.188 The provision of FDAMA challenged in
WLF II, section 401,189 sunsetted in 2006,190 leaving no guidance
as to how, if at all, manufacturers could disseminate journal
articles to physicians.191 After three years without guidance, the
FDA at last published its “Good Reprint Practices.”192 Riddled
with subjective criteria for appropriate dissemination of journal
reprints,193 it does little to provide adequate guidance. First, the
Good Reprint Practices dictate that journal articles must be
“distributed separately from information that is promotional in
nature,” yet nowhere do they define promotional material,194 and
the FDA has previously interpreted promotional material to include
“literature [and] reprints.”195 Second, the guidance document
states, without explanation, that “[t]he information must not . . .
pose a significant risk to public health, if relied upon.”196 Third, it
omits the “safe harbor” contained within section 401, as interpreted
by the FDA in WLF III.197 It perpetuates, however, the FDA’s
“interpretation” of WLF III’s holding, notwithstanding the fact that
the case was mooted for lack of controversy based on the existence
restraint absolutely does not apply to commercial speech.
188
See GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16.
189
FDAMA, Pub L. No. 105-15, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 360aaa. (2006)).
190
GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16 § II.
191
See, e.g., Robert I. Field, The FDA’s New Guidance for Off-Label
Promotion Is Only a Start, 33 P&T 220, 220 (2008) (noting that “FDAMA’s
limitations on off-label promotion expired on September 30, 2006, and Congress
has yet to reauthorize them” and that what was, at the time, a draft guidance was
“an attempt to fill the void”).
192
See generally GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16.
193
See generally id.
194
See id. § IV. B.
195
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(1-2) (2010).
196
GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16 § IV.A.
197
See Stephen Barlas, New FDA Guidance on Off-Label Promotion Falls
Short for Everyone: Obama Administration Is Likely to Revisit It, 34 P&T 122,
122 (2009).
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of this safe harbor:198 the guidance document states that the
“FDA’s legal authority to determine whether distribution of
medical or scientific information constitutes promotion of an
unapproved ‘new use’ or whether such activities cause a product to
violate the [FDCA] has not changed.”199 Because the FDA enabled
itself, in the wake of WLF III, to “proceed, in the context of caseby-case enforcement, to determine whether in the manufacturer’s
written materials and activities . . . .”200 off-label promotion has
occurred, the Good Reprint Practices leaves a manufacturer with
no guidance whatsoever as to what it may or may not lawfully do.
The manufacturer must either remain silent201 or seek
clarification—essentially permission—from the FDA to engage in
promotional speech.202
One consideration that led the Citizens United Court to declare
the FEC’s ban on speech unconstitutional has particular relevance
to the FDA’s regulatory scheme. In Citizens United, the Court
noted that “[w]hen the FEC issues advisory opinions that prohibit
speech, ‘[m]any persons, rather than undertake the considerable
burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through
case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from
protected speech.’”203 The risk of vindicating a corporation’s
speech rights through litigation is especially acute in the off-label
promotion realm: if a manufacturer is found guilty of criminally
misbranding its drug,204 the Health and Human Services Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) may preclude the manufacturer from

198

WLF III Decision Notice, supra note 17, at 14, 287.
GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16 § III.
200
See WLF III Decision Notice, supra note 17, at 14, 287.
201
Cf. Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 896 (2010) (noting that the
FEC’s regulation of corporate political speech left corporations to choose to
remain silent or request permission to speak).
202
Cf. id. at 895 (citing 2 U.S.C.A. § 437(f) (2006)) (same).
203
Id. at 896 (citing Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)).
204
See, e.g., United States v. Caputo 456 F. Supp. 2d 970 (N.D. Ill. 2006)
aff’d in part, vacated in part 517 F.3d. 935 (7th Cir. 2008). See also United
States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (denying motion to
dismiss indictment in part because 21 C.F.R. §801.4 does not offend the First
Amendment).
199
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receiving reimbursement from Medicaid and Medicare for
prescriptions of any drug it manufactures.205 Manufacturers
“cannot realistically challenge the government in court [on] . . .
whether the charges alleged are compatible with the
Constitution . . . . The risk/reward calculus is skewed dramatically
in favor of settlement when a loss would jeopardize the
[manufacturer’s] viability by forfeiting government reimbursement
for its products.”206
While the similarities between a system of regulatory
patchwork and the odious, traditional, form of prior restraint in
which “prospective speakers are not compelled by law” to seek
permission from the government may not be obvious,207 both
systems chill speech in a similar way. The Supreme Court has
previously declared unconstitutional regulations that, while not
traditionally a prior restraint, function collectively in much the
same way.208 In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, the Court struck
down a Rhode Island law designed to shield youth from books that
the state considered to be obscene, immoral, or impure.209 The
statute enabled the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage
Morality in Youth to “investigat[e] situations which may cause . . .
undesirable behavior of juveniles . . . [and] recommend legislation,
prosecution, and/or treatment that would ameliorate or eliminate
said causes.”210 The Commission, after having determined that a
205

See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revised OIG Exclusions
Authorities Resulting from Public Law 104-191, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,676, 46,686
(Sept. 2, 1998).
206
Osborn, supra note 88, at 328 (emphasis added). The result is often
astronomical settlement figures from manufacturers with varying degrees of
culpability yet uniformly desperate to maintain their financial solvency. See,
e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Pharm. Giant AstraZeneca to Pay $520
Million for Off-label Drug Mktg. (Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-civ-487.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Health
and Human Servs., Justice Dep’t. Announces Largest Health Care Fraud
Settlement in its History (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2009pres/09/20090902a.html (announcing a $2.3 Billion settlement).
207
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 895.
208
See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 (1963).
209
Id.
210
1959 R.I. Acts & Resolves 880.
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particular book was obscene,211 sent notices to publishers and
bookstores, announcing that the condemned books could not be
sold, displayed, or distributed to customers under the age of
eighteen and threatening that “[t]he Attorney General will act for
us in the case of non-compliance.”212 Upon receiving such notice,
the petitioners ceased to publish or offer for sale the banned
books.213 The Supreme Court found that Rhode Island’s scheme
constituted a system of prior restraints214 in part because “[t]he
distributor [was] left to speculate whether the Commission
considers [a] publication obscene or simply harmful to juvenile
morality,” and “the ‘cooperation’ [the Commission sought] from
distributors invariably entail[ed] the complete suppression of the
listed publication.”215
IV. FROM CARONIA ONWARD: A ROUTE FORWARD
In conducting its Central Hudson analysis, Caronia erred in
two ways, resulting ultimately in an incorrect ruling on three of the
four Central Hudson prongs. First, the court too willingly accepted
as “substantial” the FDA’s interest in subjecting new uses of
medications to FDA approval,216 and therefore did not consider the
actual interest the FDA is charged with protecting.217 Second, this
error resulted in Caronia’s finding that the regulation served a
substantial government interest under Central Hudson’s third
prong.218 Finally, despite acknowledging the consumer savvy of
the physicians to whom off-label promotion is directed,219 the court

211

See Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 64. The commission defined “obscene”
more broadly than the meaning of obscene under the First Amendment. Id.
212
Id. at 62 n.5.
213
Id. at 63.
214
Id. at 70.
215
Id. at 71.
216
See United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 398 (E.D.N.Y.
2008).
217
See infra Part VI.A.
218
See infra Part IV.B.
219
See Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 397–98.
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errantly followed the flawed reasoning of Caputo,220 failing to find
a less speech-restrictive alternative to absolute prohibition of an
entire class of commercial speech.221 This section addresses each
of these errors in turn, and proposes an alternative that, while
protecting the FDA’s mission, would also protect the First
Amendment rights of manufacturers as speakers.
A. The Government’s Substantial Interest Redefined
Courts considering the constitutionality of the FDA’s
prohibition on off-label promotion thus far222 have erred in their
conception of the government’s substantial interest served by
regulating off-label promotion. The root of the FDA’s regulatory
authority is the FDCA.223 In the FDCA, Congress announced the
purpose of the agency:
The [Food and Drug] Administration shall—
(1) Promote the public health by promptly and efficiently
reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on
the marketing of regulated products in a timely manner;
(2) . . . protect the public health by ensuring that . . . (b)
human . . . drugs are safe and effective . . . .224
Yet despite the clear Congressional mandate that the FDA
promote public health, the FDA’s purpose has been distorted or
misconceived repeatedly by both the FDA and courts in litigation
surrounding the constitutionality of the FDA’s regulation of offlabel promotion.225
WLF I recognized that Supreme Court precedent has repeatedly
held the protection of the public’s health and safety to be a
220

See United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
See Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 401; see also infra Part IV.C.
222
See generally Alliance for Natural Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp.
2d 48 (D.D.C. 2010); Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 385; Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d
at 912; WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF III, 202
F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Complaint, Allergan, supra note 46.
223
Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–99 (West 2010).
224
Id. §§ 393(b)(1–2) (emphasis added).
225
See, e.g., Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 398; Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at
921; WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 70–71.
221
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substantial government interest, and admonished that “[a]ny claim
that the government’s general interest is insufficient under Central
Hudson is frivolous.”226 Certainly, that interest is substantial, if not
compelling; but the court went further to assess the government’s
purported interests.227 It properly rejected the government’s
contention that the FDA could restrict speech out of fear that the
information will be misused228 because “[i]f there is one fixed
principle in the commercial speech arena, it is that ‘a State’s
paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful,
nonmisleading commercial information unwisely cannot justify a
decision to suppress it.’”229 It accepted, however, the argument that
the FDA had a substantial interest in compelling manufacturers to
subject uses of a drug to the FDA approval process.230 WLF I
noted, apparently with approval, that conditioning a
manufacturer’s ability to disseminate any information about a
particular use of its drug on FDA approval would “encourage[], if
not compel[]” the manufacturer to seek approval for off-label uses
of its drugs.231 The Caputo court adopted the WLF I reasoning
regarding substantial government interest232 and held that
permitting off-label promotion would “completely undermine the
government’s interest in subjecting off-label uses to the FDA’s
evaluation process as well as the government’s interest in
preserving the integrity of the FDCA’s new drug approval
process.”233
Caronia adopted the reasoning from WLF I and Caputo,
recognizing “the government’s substantial interest in subjecting
off-label uses of a drug . . . to the FDA’s evaluation process.”234
226

WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
See id. at 69–70.
228
Id.
229
Id. (citing 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996)).
230
Id. at 70.
231
Id.
232
United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
233
Id.
234
United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(citing, inter alia, WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 70–71; Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at
921).
227
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Although it acknowledged the government’s substantial interest in
ensuring the health and safety of its citizens, identified in WLF I,235
it erred in accepting the FDA’s interest in compelling
manufacturers to seek additional indications via the FDA approval
process as an additional substantial interest.236 Perhaps even more
obviously, its adoption of Caputo’s holding that the success of the
FDCA is a substantial government interest237 betrays a
fundamental misconception of the policies and purposes served by
the FDA’s approval process.238 “Preserving the integrity”239 of a
statutory scheme such as the FDCA is no more a substantial
government interest than is preserving the integrity of Rhode
Island’s law forbidding advertisement of retail alcoholic
beverages.240 Ensuring the success of a law must be subordinated
to constitutional concerns.241 Subjecting new uses of drugs to the
FDA’s approval process and ensuring the rigor of the FDCA are
means to an end—namely, promoting the public health and
safety—but neither is an end unto itself.242 The substantial—
indeed compelling—interest served by the FDA’s regulatory
scheme is, and should be conceived of as, ensuring public health

235

See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
See Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 921; WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 70–71.
237
Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 921 (citing Thompson v. Western States
Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 369 (2002)).
238
See Ball, Duffy & Russakoff, supra note 88, at 7–9 (implying that
courts applying Western States have improperly balanced this interest against
free speech rights).
239
Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
240
Compare 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489–90, 490 n.2
(1996) with Rhode Island Gen. Laws § 3-8-7 (1987).
241
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“Certainly all those
who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of
every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the
constitution, is void.” (emphasis added)).
242
Even assuming, arguendo, however, that the government may have a
substantial interest in subjecting new drug uses to FDA scrutiny, less restrictive
means of achieving this goal are available. The proposed disclosure requirement,
see infra Part IV.C, would advance this goal by incentivizing manufacturers to
seek to bolster their promotional claims with the FDA’s approval.
236
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and safety: this comports with Congress’ intent in forming the
FDA,243 with the history of drug regulation generally,244 and with
the FDA’s conception of its own mandate.245
B. Medical Marketplace, Meet the Marketplace of Ideas: OffLabel Speech Directly Advances Public Health and
Safety
Promotion of public health and safety is best served by the free
exchange of truthful, non-misleading information regarding
potential drug therapies, regardless of whether a particular use has
been approved by the FDA.246 The WLF I Court recognized this
fact, writing:
the open dissemination of scientific and medical
information regarding [off-label] treatments is of great
import. The FDA acknowledges that physicians need
reliable and up-to-date information concerning off-label
243

See Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 393(b)(1)–(2) (West

2010).
244

See generally JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
§§ 3.1–3.12 (3d ed. 2005). The precursor to the FDA was the Department of
Chemistry. The Pure Food and Drugs Act was passed in 1906, see Pure Food
and Drug Act, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), in response to public outcry over the
abhorrent conditions in meat-packing facilities. See generally UPTON SINCLAIR,
THE JUNGLE (1905). The Act announced as the Department of Chemistry’s
purpose “preventing the manufacture, sale, or transportation of . . . misbranded .
. . or deleterious foods, drugs, medicines, and liquors . . . .” Pure Food and Drug
Act, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). In 1912, through the Sherley Amendment, the category
of misbranding offenses was expanded to include false or fraudulent statements
about drugs. 37 Stat. 416 (1911). The Department of Chemistry was reorganized
and dissolved in 1927, leading to the formation of the FDA. O’REILLY, supra, §
3.3 (3d ed. 2005).
245
What We Do, FDA.GOV (last updated Nov. 18, 2010) http://www.fda.
gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/default.htm (“protecting the public health by
assuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human . . . drugs” (emphasis
added)).
246
See Ball, Duffy & Russakoff, supra note 88, at 7 (“[S]urely there is . . .
a substantial interest in providing open access to available data about
unapproved uses for drugs because it results in more informed and therefore
safer medical decision making.”).
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uses . . . . The need for reliable information is particularly
acute in the off-label treatment area because the primary
source of information usually available to physicians – the
FDA approved label – is absent.247
Under the current regulatory scheme, manufacturers are
prohibited from distributing truthful, non-misleading information
that is not in the current, FDA-approved labeling.248 This state of
affairs is anathema to the promotion of public health and safety
repeatedly recognized to be a substantial or even compelling
interest: “the FDA’s public protection mandate should lead it . . . to
welcome the wide circulation of contemporaneous and accurate
scientific data on off-label pros and cons.”249 Indeed, the FDA
itself envisions its function with regard to drugs as “protecting the
public health by assuring the safety, efficacy, and security of
human . . . drugs[;] advancing the public health by helping to speed
innovations . . . [;] and by helping the public get the accurate,
science-based information they need to use medicines and foods to
maintain and improve their health.”250 Recently, the FDA appears
to have recognized that its prohibition of off-label speech may
diminish public health.251 The government’s interest is served, not
247

WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF III,
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). See also id. at 55 (noting that
an inherent contradiction in the FDA’s regulation of off-label promotion is that
“what a manufacturer may lawfully claim that a drug does under the statutory
and regulatory scheme, and what a physician may prescribe a drug for, do not
match”).
248
See Osborn, supra note 88, at 328.
249
Smith, supra note 43, at 971; see also Fritch, supra note 70, at 364
(advocating mandatory disclosure by pharmaceutical manufacturers of all
clinical data regarding the drugs they promote).
250
What We Do, FDA.gov, supra note 245 (emphasis added).
251
See GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16 § III (“[The] FDA does
recognize, however, the important public health and policy justification
supporting dissemination of truthful and non-misleading medical journal articles
and medical or scientific reference publications on [off-label] uses of approved
drugs . . . to healthcare professionals and healthcare entities. . . . These off-label
uses or treatment regimens may be important and may even constitute a
medically recognized standard of care. Accordingly, the public health may be
advanced by healthcare professionals’ receipt of medical [literature] on
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by suppression of off-label information, but by its dissemination.252
Critics of this position point to the potential for manufacturers
to manipulate or mislead physicians by sharing only favorable
information regarding their products.253 This complaint is
unfounded for three reasons. First, as noted above, off-label
promotion is not inherently misleading.254 Second, even assuming
a manufacturer did attempt to mislead physicians, market
competition would drive the dissemination of not only favorable
information, but also information revealing any risks or
inefficacies of the drugs.255 Competing manufacturers, insurance
companies, pharmacy benefit managers, and states often
“counterdetail” by disseminating information about either the
superior efficacy of their own product or the lack of efficacy in
their competitors’ drugs.256 Thus, while the manufacturer of drug
unapproved new uses of approved or cleared medical products that are truthful
and not misleading.” (emphasis added)).
252
See Peter E. Kalb & Paul E. Greenberg, Legal and Economic
Perspectives Concerning US Government Investigations of Alleged Off-Label
Promotion by Drug Manufacturers, 27 PHARMACOECONOMICS 623, 624 (2009)
(“[I]t may follow that suppressing untruthful or misleading information
advances public health, but there is no reason to believe that suppressing the
dissemination of truthful, non-misleading information will have that same
effect.”); Byron Stier, Promotion of Off-Label Use: In Favor of a Regulatory
Retreat, 19 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 609, 609 (2009) (arguing that “the FDA’s
background prohibition on off-label promotion should recede and just go away”
in part because the prohibition “is counterproductive because it curtails the
dissemination of useful information that doctors need to make informed
judgments”).
253
See Marc J. Scheineson & M. Lynn Sykes, Major New Initiatives
Require Increased Disclosure of Clinical Trial Information, 60 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 525, 543 (2005) (noting that “there have been a number of allegations of
pharmaceutical and device companies selectively disclosing favorable clinical
trials and/or failing to disclose unfavorable clinical trial results”). But see infra
Part IV.C (discussing a potential disclosure solution).
254
See United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 397–98 (E.D.N.Y.
2008); WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 65–69 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF
III, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See also supra §§ II.C.1–2.
255
Cf. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (noting the hardiness of commercial speech).
256
See, e.g., IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2010)
cert granted 131 S.Ct. 857 (2011) (indicating Vermont has a “counter-speech”
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X may trumpet to physicians a new study showing a promising
new use for drug X, the manufacturer of competing drug Y has an
economic incentive to inform those same physicians of five studies
showing that drug X is inefficacious for that use. The result is the
dissemination of a broad range of scientific information, leading to
a richer marketplace of ideas and a better-informed medical
community.
Third, the paternalistic view that the government may suppress
speech where the recipients of the speech may misuse the
information provided has been repeatedly rejected in the context of
off-label promotion,257 and beyond.258 The Supreme Court has
noted that “people will perceive their own best interests if only
they are well enough informed, and . . . the best means to that end
is to open the channels of communication rather than to close
them.”259 Furthermore, the Second Circuit recently struck down a
paternalistic Vermont statute that limited the availability to doctors
of information regarding medications.260 Vermont prohibited
manufacturers from using information about physicians’
prescribing habits, compiled and sold by data mining companies,
in order to tailor promotional speech to each physician’s need.261
program in place to disseminate information to physicians).
257
See Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 398 (citing 44 Liquormart v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996)); WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69–70 (“To the
extent that the FDA is endeavoring to keep information from physicians out of
concern that they will misuse that information, the regulation is wholly and
completely unsupportable.”).
258
See Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 896 (2010) (holding that
the government may not “select what . . . speech is safe for public consumption
by applying an ambiguous test”); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 497; Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (“[W]e
have rejected the ‘highly paternalistic’ view that government has complete
power to suppress or regulate commercial speech.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 770.
259
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
260
IMS Health, 630 F.3d at 267 (“We conclude that because [the
challenged statute] is a commercial speech restriction that does not advance the
substantial state interests asserted by Vermont, and is not narrowly tailored to
advance those interests, the statute cannot survive intermediate scrutiny under
Central Hudson.”).
261
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 4631(a) & (d) (2010).
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The Vermont legislature gave several justifications for this statute,
including: (1) the aims of manufacturers in marketing their drugs
“often . . . conflict with the goals of the state”;262 (2) the
“marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and effectiveness is
frequently one-sided” resulting in prescribing based upon
“incomplete and biased information”;263 and (3) “[p]ublic health is
ill served by the massive imbalance in information presented to
doctors.”264 Finding that the Vermont legislature “inten[ded] to
interfere with the marketplace of ideas to promote the interests of
the state,”265 the Second Circuit struck down Vermont’s statute,
and noted that, even if Vermont succeeded in manipulating
physicians’ prescribing habits, “the Supreme Court reminds us that
‘[i]t is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely
available, that the First Amendment makes for us.’”266
Physicians’ prescribing decisions, and therefore the public
health, will be improved if physicians are well-informed about
potential off-label uses. When prescribing medications, physicians
need to know whether a medication is a safe and effective
treatment: the research of other physicians, scientists, and
academics constitutes an essential source of this information.267
Manufacturers are in a unique position as the most efficient
aggregators of information about their products, to disseminate
such information to physicians.268 The FDA’s policy of absolute
suppression of manufacturer dissemination of this information

262

Vt. Act No. 80 § 1(3) (2007).
Id. § 1(4).
264
Id. § 1(6).
265
IMS Health, 630 F.3d at 270 (citing Vt. Act No. 80 § 1).
266
Id. at 270 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
267
WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 63 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF III,
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
268
See Stier, supra note 252, at 610–11; Smith, supra note 43, at 971–72.
See also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 (“[O]rdinarily the
advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service
that he himself provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else.”
(emphasis added)).
263
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frustrates, rather than serves, the interest of enhancing and
protecting public health.
C. Less Speech-Restrictive Means of Enhancing Public Health:
Citizens United’s Approval of Disclosure and
Disclaimer and the Benefit of Sophisticated Consumers
Given the clarification of the government’s substantial interest
in regulating off-label promotion—enhancing public health and
safety269—and the failing of a complete ban on off-label speech to
achieve that interest,270 it follows that the current regulatory
scheme is more restrictive than necessary. Despite Caronia’s
inability to identify any less speech-restrictive means,271 such
means do exist and have been proposed.272 The most promising—
and least speech-restrictive—means of regulating off-label
promotion while remaining respectful of the speakers’
constitutional rights comes from what is, at first blush, an unlikely
source.
Despite the deep divide between political and commercial
speech, much of the reasoning in Citizens United applies just as
well to heavily-regulated commercial speech.273 The parallel
infirmities of the regulatory schemes at issue in Citizens United
and Caronia suggest that the less speech-restrictive means

269

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
271
See United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 401–02 (E.D.N.Y.
2008); see also Ball, Duffy & Russakoff, supra note 88, at 1.
272
Blackwell & Beck, supra note 88, at 456 (“Other alternatives include: 1)
permitting off-label promotion to physicians but not consumers; 2) permitting
promotion through any means other than direct to consumer advertising; 3)
permitting speech promoting off-label uses except on product labels; and 4)
simply clarifying the boundaries between dissemination of off-label information
that is considered promotional and, this, prohibited and dissemination that is
considered nonpromtional and, thus, permitted.”); see also Ball, Duffy &
Russakoff, supra note 88, at 1 (proposing alternative means of encouraging
manufacturers to seek additional indications for their medication while
respecting free speech rights).
273
See supra Part III.B.
270
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proposed in Citizens United274 would be equally applicable in the
off-label promotion context. In striking down section 441’s ban on
corporate independent expenditures, Citizens United upheld the
requirement that corporations disclose their sponsorship of the
messages.275 Relying on precedent that found the government’s
interest in the prevention of real or apparent corruption inadequate
to justify a ban on independent expenditures,276 the Court held that
disclosure and disclaimer is a “less restrictive alternative to more
comprehensive regulations of speech”277 that avoided the
constitutional infirmities of an outright ban.
Although First Amendment jurisprudence traditionally frowns
on compelled speech,278 compelled disclosures in commercial
speech are favored over the alternative here: complete suppression
of a particular type of commercial speech.279 Thus, if a required
disclosure would be a constitutional means of “permit[ting]
citizens and shareholders to react to the [political] speech of
corporate entities in a proper way,”280 certainly, it would be
constitutional in regard to commercial speech, where compelled
speech is already less problematic,281 in order to facilitate the

274

See Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010).
Compare id. at 913–14 with Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2
U.S.C.A. §§ 441d(a)(3), (d)(2) (West 2010).
276
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 901–02 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 26 (1976)).
277
Id. at 915.
278
See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634
(1943) (refusing to sustain a statute mandating a compulsory flag salute in
public schools); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001)
(“Just as the First Amendment may prevent the government from prohibiting
speech, the Amendment may prevent the government from compelling
individuals to express certain views.”).
279
See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 73 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF
III, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding “the restrictions in the Guidance
Documents are considerably more extensive than necessary to further the
substantial government interest in encouraging manufacturers to get new uses
on-label”); Bates v. State Bar Ass’n of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1970)
(noting that the “preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than less”).
280
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915.
281
See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 70.
275
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dissemination of accurate information regarding the off-label use
of drugs.
Given the fact that a physician is the targeted recipient of the
off-label speech,282 disclosure would likely be an even more
effective regulatory strategy in the off-label context than in the
political speech context. Physicians are sophisticated consumers of
speech regarding off-label drug uses: they are well aware of the
implications for safety and efficacy inherent in a prescription
drug’s off-label status.283 A disclosure to physicians that the
advocated use (1) is being advanced by a speaker with a
commercial interest in the product, and (2) has not been approved
as safe and effective by the FDA, would signal the need for a
discerning approach to the information provided and caution in the
use of the drug for that purpose.284
Concerns have been raised about the potential for a
manufacturer engaging in off-label promotion to skew the
information provided to physicians by sharing only favorable
information about a drug’s efficacy for an off-label use, while
downplaying or omitting information that suggests inefficacy.285
Consistent with the First Amendment, the FDA could require
manufacturers to disseminate a bibliography, complete with
abstracts, of all scientific literature, favorable and unfavorable,
discussing the off-label use which the manufacturer proposes.286 In
282

See id. at 63.
See id. (noting that “despite the FDA’s occasional statements in its
briefs to the contrary, physicians are a highly educated, professionally-trained
and sophisticated audience”).
284
See id. at 73 (Faced with such a disclosure, “[a] physician would be
immediately alerted to the fact that the ‘substantial evidence standard’ had not
been satisfied, and would evaluate the communicated message accordingly.”).
285
See Fritch, supra note 70, 357 (“For any given prescription drug
therapy, there may be a variety of positive and negative studies available, yet
drug manufacturers are motivated only to promote studies that reflect positively
on their drug.”).
286
See, e.g., WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 73. Here, although compelled speech
is often suspect under First Amendment jurisprudence, it is the lesser of two
evils. See Bates v. State Bar Ass’n of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1970). For
example, under such a regime, Mr. Caronia could have discussed with the
physician the use of Xyrem in fibromyalgia patients, one of the off-label uses he
283
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fact, under the FDA’s most recent guidance for the dissemination
of scientific literature that discusses off-label uses of medications,
similar requirements exist.287 Given the existence of such a
requirement, concerns about misleading dissemination of off-label
information are unfounded.
Critics of a disclosure-based approach to regulating off-label
promotion may be concerned that allowing off-label promotion,
even with disclosure, may circumvent the FDA’s approval
process;288 however ample opportunities to implement incentives
to seek on-label status for drugs remain available.289 The
government would be free to, inter alia
preempt product liability cases for products that receive
FDA approval, but preserve product liability theories
against uses which have not received FDA approval[;] . . .
provide several economic incentives to encourage
companies to seek FDA approval for new uses[;] . . . [or]
establish a streamlined approval process for an alreadyapproved drugs’ additional widespread uses.290
was originally accused of promoting. If he chose to do so, he would be required
to provide the physician with a bibliography containing the peer-reviewed,
medical journal articles discussing this use for Xyrem. See PUBMED,
http://www.pubmed.gov (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (search for “sodium oxybate
fibromyalgia”).
287
See GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 16 § 4.B (mandating that
manufacturers must disseminate “a comprehensive bibliography of publications
discussing adequate and well-controlled clinical studies published in medical
journals or medical or scientific texts about the use of the drug” and “a
representative publication, when such information exists, that reaches contrary
or different conclusions regarding the unapproved use”).
288
See, e.g., United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (“Manufacturers, knowing that they could promote off-label uses, would
have an incentive only to seek FDA approval for uses that would be approved
easily and inexpensively. Thus, the Court holds that subjecting off-label uses to
the FDA’s evaluation process is a substantial governmental interest.”) But see
supra, Part IV.A (noting paternalistic fears of misuse of speech does not justify
suppression of the speech).
289
Blackwell & Beck, supra note 88, at 456 (listing additional, less speech
restrictive safeguards against circumvention of the approval process).
290
Ball, Duffy & Russakoff, supra note 88, at 1. See also Blackwell &
Beck, supra note 88, at 456.
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Additionally, the very fact that a particular use is off-label may
give some physicians pause. Even under a disclosure regime, there
is a clear economic incentive to “get off-label treatments onlabel,”291 obviating the perceived need for the FDA’s current
oppressive regulatory scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
Caronia presents a concrete example of the ramifications for
free speech inherent in the FDA’s current regulatory regime.
Fortunately, the constitutional infirmities of the FDA’s scheme can
be remedied by a straightforward application of First Amendment
law, including, in particular, the recent decision in Citizens United.
The complexity of the FDA’s scheme, like the FEC’s in Citizens
United, is so abstruse that it essentially functions as a prior
restraint. This de facto prior restraint is indefensible, however,
upon a careful examination of the purpose and fit of the FDA’s
stranglehold on off-label speech. This stranglehold may ensure the
sanctity of the FDA’s regulatory scheme, but this, in itself, is not a
substantial governmental interest: the FDA’s only substantial
interest in regulating off-label promotion is the promotion of
public health and safety. Dissemination, not suppression, of
scientific information regarding off-label uses of drugs serves this
interest. To the extent that concern may linger as to a potential
conflict of interest between the promotion of public health and the
manufacturer’s commercial interests, the Supreme Court, in
Citizens United, has approved of a less restrictive means of
policing this conflict:292 candid disclosure of the manufacturer’s
financial interest in the off-label speech should replace the current
prohibition.293 An appeal of Caronia is currently pending:294
therefore the Second Circuit, and potentially the Supreme Court,
291

United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010).
293
See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 73 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated sub nom. WLF
III, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
294
See Unofficial Oral Argument Transcript, United States v. Caronia, No.
09 Cr. 5006 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2010) (on file with author); Caronia Brief, supra
note 1.
292
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will soon have the opportunity to correct the constitutional
deprivations currently worked by the FDA and to extend protection
to a subset of commercial speech essential to the public health.

